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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 ANKARA 2580

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2
TAGS: OREP(SOLARZ, STEPHEN), TU, GR, CY
SUBJ: CONGRESSMAN STEPHEN SOLARZ' VISIT TO ANKARA

1. SUMMARY: CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ SPENT ACTIVE DAY APRIL 4 MEETING WITH PRIMIN ECEVIT, FONMIN OKCUN, DEFMIN ISIK, LEADERS OF THREE OPPOSITION PARTIES(DEMIREL, ERBAKAN AND TURKES), AND THE ISRAELI CHARGE. DURING EVENING RECEPTION GIVEN BY THE AMBASSADOR IN HONOR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEES OF SENATE AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, SOLARZ ALSO SPOKE TO SEVERAL TURKISH PARLIAMENTARIANS AND VARIOUS OTHER GOVERNMENT MINISTERS AND OFFICIALS. DURING COURSE OF THE DAY HE TAPED AN EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH TURKISH TELEVISION AND HELD PRESS CONFERENCE. IN ALL CONVERSATIONS, SOLARZ STRONGLY ENDORSED THE ADMINISTRATION'S DECISION TO SEEK TO LIFT THE EMBARGO BY REPEAL OF 620X OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT (FAA), EXPLAINING THAT THIS APPROACH WOULD HAVE BETTER CHANCE OF SUCCESS THAN TRYING TO GAIN ENDORSEMENT OF THE DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT (DCA). HE ALSO EXPRESSED OTIMISM ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION'S PACKAGE FOR TURKEY BUT CAUTIONED THAT SUCCESS WOULD BE DEPENDENT ON A CONCERTED EFFORT BY THE ADMINISTRATION. HE ALSO INDICATED PROSPECTS FOR CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL WOULD BE GREATLY ENHANCED BY CONSTRUCTIVE, NEGOTIABLE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS ON CYPRUS AND BY SOME KIND OF INDICATION BY THE
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GOT THAT THE US INSTALLATIONS WOULD BE REOPENED PROMPTLY. SOLARZ TOLD US HE LEFT ANKARA WITH IMPRESSION THAT GOT IS PLEASED WITH ADMINISTRATION'S DECISION AND THAT THE PROPOSALS ON CYPURS WHICH TURKISH CYPRIOTS WILL PRSENT DURING NEXT FEW DAYS WILL BE SUFFICIENTLY CONSTRUCTIVE TO ASSIST IN THE FORT TO GAIN CONGRESSIONAL ENDORSEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN PROGRAM. HE WAS LESS OPTIMISTIC

THAT GOT WOULD BE SUFFICIENTLY FORTHCOMING PUBLICLY CONCERNING
FUTURE STATUS OF US INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS. END SUMMARY

2. CONGRESSMAN STEPHEN SOLARZ SPENT ACTIVE DAY APRIL 4
IN ANKARA MEETING WITH GOT LEADERS, TURISH OPPOSITION
FIGURES, AND EHT ISRAELI CHARGE. HIS FIRST APPOINTMENT
WAS WITH FONMIN GUNDUZ OKCUN. THE MEETING WAS A PREFACE
TO IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING APPOINTMENT WITH PRIMMIN ECEVIT
AND WAS THEREFORE NOT PARTICULARLY SUBSTANTIVE. NEVERTHELESS,
SOLARZ DID EXPLORE VARIOUS FACETS OF US-TURKISH, GREEK-
TURKISH, AND CYPRUS PROBLEMS WITH IKCUN. OKCUN'S RESPONSES
WERE UNIFORMALY RIGID AND UNIMAGINATIVE. SOLARZ LATER
INDICATED THAT HE BELIEVED OKCUN REPRESENTED A SERIOUS NEGATIVE
ELEMENT IN GOT.

3. SOLARZ THEN HAD A TWO-HOUR MEETING WITH PRIMIN ECEVIT.
SOLARZ HAD SUGGESTED THAT BECAUSE OF HIS WELL-KNOWN
PRO-TURKISH STANCE, A TETE-A-TETE WITH ECEVIT MIGHT PRODUCE
A MORE FRANK EXCHANGE THAN WOULD OCCUR IN MEETING
ATTENDED BY EMBASSY OFFICIALS. WE, IN TURN, HAD AGREED
THAT ECEVIT MIGHT GIVE MORE CREDENCE TO SOLARZ VIEWS IF
NO ONE FROM THE EMBASSY WERE PRESENT. THEREFORE, SOLARZ
MET WITH ECEVIT PRIVATELY. THE FOLLOWING REPORT OF THEIR
CONVERSATION IS BASED ON SOLARZ' NOTES WHICH HE SHARED
WITH US.

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A. PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON REPEAL OF 620X.
ECEVIT SAID THAT HIS APPROACH TO THE DCA WAS THE SAME AS
PRESIDENT CARTER'S. HE CONSIDERED THE EMBARGO TO BE A
NEGATIVE FACTOR IN US-TURKISH RELATIONSHIP WHICH SHOULD
BE REMOVED BEFORE ANY POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT COULD BE
CONSIDERED. THE EMBARGO THEREFRE SHOULD BE LIFTED IMMED-
IATELY. MOREOVER, BECAUSE OF THE VARIOUS CHANGES THAT HAVE
TAKEN PLACE SINCE THE DCA WAS NEGOTIATED, THE GOT BELIEVED
THAT CERTAIN CHANGES WERE NECESSARY. PRESIDENT CARTER
HAD ACCEPTED THE TURKISH POSITION. DURING THE TALKS WITH
DEPSEC CHRISTOPHER, ECEVIT HAD AGREED TO PROMPT RENEGOTIATION
OF DCA.

B. STATUS OF THE INSTALLATIONS. THE US INTELLIGENCE
INSTALLATIONS IN TURKEY SERVED PURPOSE OF DETENTE. THEREFORE,
AS ECEVIT HAD EARLIER TOLD SECRETARY VANCE, DESPITE SOVIET
OBJECTIONS TO THE OPERATONS OF THOSE INSTALLATIONS, HE WOULD
SUPPORT THEIR CONTINUED EXISTENCE. ANY INDICATION THAT INSTAL-
LATIONS ARE BEING "RENTED" OFFENDS BOTH TURKISH AND AMERICAN
DIGNITY AND SHOULD BE AVOIDED. ECEVIT CONSIDERS THE PROVISION
OF TERRITORY FOR THOSE INSTALLATIONS TO BE PART OF TURKEY'S
GENERAL CONTRIBUTION TO WESTERN DEFENSE.

C. REOPENING OF THE INSTALLATIONS. OPENING OF THE

INSTALLATIONS WOULD BE POLITICALLY DIFFICULT BEFORE THENEGOTIATION
OF A NEW AGREEMENT. GOT WILL STATE PUBLICLY THAT IT WILL BE
PREPARED TO OPEN THEM PROMPTLY ONCE A NEW AGREEMENT IS
REACHED.

D. CYPURS. ON TERRITORY, ECEVIT SAID THE PRESENT
DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN THE TWO REGIONS IS NEGOTIABLE WITHIN
REASONABLE LIMITS. HE CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, IT IS POLITICALLY
DIFFICULT TO STEP BACKWARDS, ESPECIALLY SINCE PEOPLE ARE ALREADY
SETTLED IN AREAS NEAR THE PRESENT DEMARCATION LINE. A CYPRUS
SETTLEMENT MUST PROVIDE FOR THE SECURITY AND VIABILITY OF THE
TURKISH ZONE. IN THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS TO BE
PRESENTED WALDHEIM, A GOOD NUMBER OF GREEK CYPRIOTS WILL
BE PERMITTED TO RESETTLE IN WHAT IS NOW THE TURKISH ZONE.
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TOTAL FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IS NOT NOW POSSIBLE BUT IS AN

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EVENTUAL GOAL. FREEDOM OF SETTLEMENT, HOWEVER, IS A
MORE DIFFICULT PROBLEM. THE GEOGRAPHIC PROPORTIONS OF THE
TWO ZONES OF THE ISLAND ARE IMPORTANT, BUT THEIR RELATIVE
SIZE SHOULDNOT BE MADE INTO A FETISH BY THE GREEK CYPRIOTS.
THE KEY TO A SETTLEMENT IS POLITICS, AND ANY SETTLEMENT
MUST PROVIDE FOR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL VIABILITY
OF THE TWO ZONES. IF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS REALLY WANT A
SOLUTION--"AND I AM NOT SURE THEY DO"--A SOLUTION IS
POSSIBLE. SOLARZ THEN ASKED ECEVIT HOW HE WOULD RESPOND

TO THE CONTENTION THAT GOT IS SATISFIED WITH STATUS QUO IN CYPRUS AND HAS NO BASIC INTEREST IN REACHING AGREEMENT. ECEVIT SAID HIS PARTY HAD ALWAYS OPPOSED PARTITION. BEGINNING IN 1963 IT HAD PROPOSED A FEDERAL SOLUTION. SUCH CONCEPT SEEMED UTOPIAN UNTIL 1974, BUT NOW SEEMED TO BE THE MOST REASONABLE AND LIKELY WAY TO RESOLVE CURRENT SITUATION. HE SAID THE PRIMARY REASON HIS PARTY OPPOSED PARTITION WAS THE DESIRE NOT TO GIVE GREECE A STRATEGIC POSITION IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND OFF THE TURKISH SOUTHERN SHORE. HE SAID, HOWEVER, IF PRESENT SITUATION CONTINUES IN CYPRUS HE BELIEVES PARTITION IS INEVITABLE. IN RESPONSE TO SOLARZ' QUESTION OF WHY GOT IS OPPOSED TO FREEDOM OF SETTLEMENT, ECEVIT SAID IT WAS RISKY FROM A SECURITY POINT OF VIEW. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY ENCOURAGE SETTLEMENT OF TROUBLEMAKERS. ON THE TURKISH SIDE. ULTIMATELY, HE PROJECTED PARTIAL BUT NOT TOTAL FREEDOM OF SETTLEMENT.

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E. TURKISH RELATIONS WITH US AND NATO. IN RESPONSE TO SOLARZ' QUESTION AS TO WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORTS TO LIFT THE EMBARGO FAILED, ECEVIT SAID THAT REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORTS TURKEY FACED THE NEED TO REVISE ITS NATIONAL DEFENSE CONCEPT TO MAKE IT MORE RESPONSIVE TO TURKEY'S NATIONAL INTERESTS. HE SUGGESTED, HOWEVER, THAT CONTINUATION OF THE EMBARGO WOULD INCREASE TURKEY'S NEED TO REVISE ITS PRESENT POSTURE. HE SAID THAT BECAUSE OF TURKEY'S SENSITIVE GEOGRAPHIC POSITION, IT COULD NOT REMAIN IN LIMBO MUCH LONGER. HE ALSO ASSERTED THAT CONTINUATION OF THE EMBARGO WOULD MAKE GREEK CYPRIOTS LESS INTERESTED IN A CYPRUS SOLUTION. THEN IN A FLIGHT OF NATIONALISM (WHICH ECEVIT HAS ALSO EXHIBITED IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS DURING LAST MONTH), ECEVIT SAID THAT THE TURKISH NATION EXISTED CENTURIES BEFORE NATO WAS FOUNDED, AND IT COULD CONTINUE TO EXIST REGARDLESS OF ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WEST. HE THEN SAID, HOWEVER, THAT IF TURKEY IS FORCED TO TAKE A RADICAL STEP, IT WILL NOT UPSET THE BALANCE IN THE AREA. (BY THIS SOLARZ BELIEVED ECEVIT MEANT THAT TURKEY MIGHT WITHDRAW FROM THE WESTERN ALLIANCE BUT WOULD NOT SEEK RE-ALIGNMENT WITH SOVIET UNION.) ECEVIT THEN EXPLAINED THAT ATATURK HAD NOT ESTABLISHED AN ALLIANCE WITH THE WEST BUT HAD CONCENTRATED HIS EFFORTS ON IMPROVING TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH ITS BALKAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN NEIGHBORS. IN KEEPING WITH ATATURK'S BASIC FOREIGN POLICY APPROACH, THE GOT IS PLANNING TO BASE ITS FOREIGN POLICY ON ITS GEOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL REALITIES, WHICH IN THE FIRST INSTANCE MEANS IMPROVING TURKISH RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS.

F. US RELATIONS WITH RADICAL ARAB STATES. ECEVIT

TOLD SOLARZ THE US SHOULD SEEK RAPPROCHEMENT WITH LIBYA,
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IRAQ, AND ALGERIA--"THE ONLY OIL-PRODUCING STATES WHICH ARE USING THEIR INCOME FOR THE GOOD OF THEIR PEOPLE". ECEVIT SAID THE WEST SHOULD NOT REACT NEGATIVELY TO STATES WHICH ADOPT SOCIALISM. (ECEVIT GENERALLY BELIEVES THAT MANY WESTERN COUNTRIES, AND PARTICULARLY THE US, CONSIDER SOCIALISM TO BE AN ANATHEMA. SOLARZ TRIED TO EXPLAIN THAT SOCIALISM NO LONGER CARRIES THE NEGATIVE EMOTIONAL BAGGAGE THAT IT ONCE DID FOR AMERICANS AND OTHER WESTENERS.) ECEVIT SAID THAT WHEN LIBYAN LEADER JALLUD VISITED TURKEY, THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE THAT TURKEY AND LIBYA HAD ISSUED HAD MENTIONED UN RESOLUTIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST. ECEVIT SAID THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT LIBYA HAD AGREED TO A COMMUNIQUE WHICH MENTIONED THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL. HE SAID THIS STEP FORWARD HAD GONE UNNOTICED BY THE REST OF THE WORLD. ECEVIT ALSO SAID THAT LIBYA HAD NEVER ATTEMPTED TO PRESSURE TURKEY TO CHANGE ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL.

G. AEGEAN DISPUTE. ECEVIT SAID THE STATUS OF THE AEGEAN SEABED SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY NEGOTIATION RATHER THAN ARBITRATION. "IT IS TOO IMPORTANT TO BE LEFT TO CHANCE." THE PROBLEM AS FAR AS TURKEY IS CONCERNED IS A POLITICAL ONE AND NOT A JURIDICAL ONE. FOR THIS REASON, GREECE AND TURKEY SHOULD ENGAGE IN SERIOUS POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE STATUS OF THE AEGEAN. HE SAID THAT TURKEY SHOULD OF COURSE LEAVE OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF ULTIMATE REFERRAL OF THE DISPUTE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE OR ANOTHER THIRD PARTY ARBITOR; BUT TO DO SO AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS WOULD SIMPLY INSURE THAT THE GREEKS WOULD NOT NEGOTIATE.

H. MONTREUX SUMMIT. ECEVIT SAID THAT AT MONTREUX HE AND CARAMANLIS HAD AGREED ON THE NEED TO ESTABLISH A CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE. HE SAID THE TWO LEADERS HAD MANAGED TO DO SO; BUT TO CREATE A CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES WILL BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT. TURKEY HAS NO IRREDENTIST AMBITIONS CONCERNING THE AEGEAN
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ISLANDS BUT THE GREEKS ARE OBSESSED BY A PERCEIVED TURKISH THREAT. IN THE PAST WHEN GREECE AND TURKEY WERE LEFT TO RESOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS BY THEMSELVES, THEY WERE ABLE TO DO SO. THE WEST MUST KEEP AN EQUI-DISTANT POSITION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

I. CYPRUS INTERVENTION OF 1974. ECEVIT SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT MANY AMERICANS HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY UPSET BY THE SECOND TURKISH MILITARY OPERATION IN CYPRUS IN AUGUST 1974. HE SAID THAT BY THE TIME OF THE FIRST CEASE-FIRE, THE TURKISH ARMY HAD TAKEN OVER ONLY A SMALL AREA. GOT HAD HOPED THAT THE GREEKS WOULD REALIZE THAT THE SITUATION HAD FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGED IN CYPRUS AND WOULD AGREE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BROAD SECURITY ZONE AROUND THE TURKISH OCCUPIED AREA PENDING A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. THE GREEK REFUSAL TO CONSIDER THIS SECURITY ZONE, REPORTS OF ATROCITIES, AND OTHER THREATS TO THE SECURITY OF TURKISH COMMUNITIES IN THE AREA BETWEEN NICOSIA AND FAMAGUSTA HAD FORCED THE GOT TO UNDERTAKE THE SECOND OPERATION.

J. CYPRUS--TURKISH CYPRIOT TERRITORIAL PROPOSAL. RETURNING TO THE SUBJECT OF THE ANTICIPATED TURKISH CYPRIOT

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PROPOSALS, ECEVIT SAID THAT HE OPPOSED THE PRESENTATION OF A MAP. HE SAID A MAP IS VERY RISKY BECAUSE ON THE ONE HAND IT COULD NOT POSSIBLY SATISFY THE EXAGGERATED EXPECTATIONS OF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS; AND ON THE OTHER, ONCE A LINE IS DRAWN IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO MODIFY. HE SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE FAR BETTER TO PRESENT A TERRITORIAL PROPOSAL IN TERMS OF GEOGRAPHIC AREAS WITH SPECIFIC LINES TO BE DRAWN IN THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION. HE SAID THE TURKISH SIDE WOULD BE WILLING TO SUBMIT A MAP IN THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION.

4. SOLARZ LEFT THE MEETING WITH ECEVIT IN AN OPTIMISTIC MOOD. HE RECEIVED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE TURKS AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS ARE SERIOUSLY ENGAGED IN AN EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE CYPRUS PROBLEM.

HE WAS ALSO SATISFIED WITH THE FORMULATION THAT ECEVIT HAD OFFERED CONCERNING THE FUTURE STATUS OF THE US INSTALLATIONS. HOWEVER, IN A STATEMENT TO THE PRESS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING MEETING WITH SOLARZ, ECEVIT SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN SLIGHTLY LESS POSITIVE THAN SOLARZ HAD BELIEVED HE WOULD BE.

5. SOLARZ' NEXT MEETING WAS WITH ALPARSLAN TURKES, CHAIRMAN OF THE EXTREME RIGHT-WING NATIONALIST ACTION PARTY (NAP). SOLARZ WAS STRUCK BY TURKES' APPARENT MODERATION AND REASONABLENESS. IN ANSWER TO SOLARZ' QUESTION ABOUT THE POSSIBLE TURKISH REACTION SHOULD THE ARMS EMBARGO NOT BE LIFTED, TURKES SAID IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO CONTINUE TO RESIST STRONG
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LEFTIST PRESSURES TO CHANGE THE ORIENTATION OF TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY, TO PULL TURKEY OUT OF NATO, AND TO ACHIEVE A NON-ALIGNED STATUS OR EVEN ADHERENCE TO THE WARSAW PACT. IN STRONG TERMS TURKES AFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT OF NATO, THE US, AND THE WEST. HE SAID THAT THE GREATEST EXTERNAL THREAT FACING TURKEY STILL COMES FROM THE SOVIET UNION; THE INTERNAL THREAT DERIVES FROM THE UNCHECKED ACTIVITIES OF MARXIST ORGANIZATIONS. TURKES ADDED THAT HE BELIEVES GREECE AND TURKEY MUST ESTABLISH A GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY AND BECOME FIRM ALLIES. REGARDING CYPRUS, TURKES AFFIRMED HIS SUPPORT FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WHICH WILL CREATE A FEDERAL, INDEPENDENT STATE WITH TWO SEPARATE COMMUNITIES. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE NAP HAS NOT TAKEN A PUBLIC POSITION TOWARD THE CYPRUS ISSUE IN THREE YEARS AND ADDED THAT HIS PARTY WILL NOT OPPOSE A SETTLEMENT REACHED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. ON THE AEGEAN QUESTION, TURKES SAID THAT THE NAP SUPPORTS AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION REACHED THROUGH "PATIENT NEGOTIATIONS" AND WITHOUT SUBMISSION OF THE DISPUTE TO A THIRD PARTY, LIKE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ).

6. SOLARZ THEN LUNCED AT EMBASSY RESIDENCE WITH THE ISRAELI CHARGE FROM WHO HE SOUGHT THE ISRAELI VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF TURKEY TO ISRAELI SECURITY. THE ISRAELI CHARGE WAS UNEQUIVOCAL IN HIS ASSERTION THAT ISRAELI INTERESTS WERE CLEARLY SERVED BY TURKEY'S CONTINUED PARTICIPATION IN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AND FELT THIS DEPENDED ON PROMPT REMOVAL OF EMBARGO. HE SAID ANY CHANGE IN TURKEY'S STATUS WOULD NOT ONLY INCREASE THE POTENTIAL FOR INSTABILITY IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, BUT ALSO WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN TURKEY'S ESTABLISHING CLOSER RELATIONS WITH ARAB COUNTRIES AT ISRAEL'S EXPENSE. HE SAID REVITALIZATION OF US-TURKISH RELATIONS WOULD ENHANCE ISRAELI SECURITY.

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7. SOLARZ THEN HELD BRIEF PRESS CONFERENCE, TRANSCRIPT OF WHICH WAS REPORTED IN ANKARA 2538 (DTG 041512Z APR 78).

8. CONTINUING HIS CONTACTS WITH OPPOSITION LEADERS, SOLARZ THEN MET WITH NECMETTIN ERBAKAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST NATIONAL SALVATION PARTY (NSP). IN RESPONSE TO SOLARZ' QUESTIONS ERBAKAN WAS DOCTRINAIRE AND INFLEXIBLE, BUT NOT QUITE UNFRIENDLY. CALLING THE ARMS EMBARGO A "HOSTILE" ACT WHICH HAS HAD AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON US-TURKISH RELATIONS, ERBAKAN SAID THE ONLY BENEFICIARY OF THE EMBARGO HAS BEEN THE SOVIET UNION. HE ADDED THAT TURKEY CANNOT PERMIT ITS ARMED FORCES TO DETERIORATE, AND IF THE US WILL NOT PROVIDE ARMS, THEN AMERICAN POLICY WILL FORCE TURKEY TO LOOK ELSEWHERE. MOREOVER, FAILURE TO LIFT THE EMBARGO WILL MAKE TURKEY RE-EVALUATE ITS RELATIONS WITH NATO. TURKEY COULD NOT CONTINUE AS A "LIMPING PARTNER" AND WOULD HAVE NO REASON TO MAINTAIN RELATIONS WITH NATO AS BEFORE. CONCERNING CYPRUS, ERBAKAN ASSERTED THAT THE BEST SOLUTION IS THE CREATION OF "TWO SEPARATE, INDEPENDENT STATES" BECAUSE THE TWO COMMUNITIES CANNOT LIVE TOGETHER. HE CHARACTERIZED A FEDERAL SOLUTION AS A GREEK PLAN TO INFILTRATE THE TURKISH SECTOR AND EVENTUALLY WORK TOWARD ENOSIS. HE ADDED, "THE BEST STATUS IS THE CURRENT ONE, AND IT IS THE ONLY POSITION WE CAN DEFEND PUBLICLY." ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE RETURN OF VAROSHA TO GREEK CYPRIOT CONTROL, THE NSP LEADER SAID, "ABSOLUTELY NOT; IT IS A TURKISH CITY." COMMENTING ON REPORTS OF NSP OBSTRUCTION OF A CYPRUS SOLUTION IN PREVIOUS DEMIREL GOVERNMENTS, ERBAKAN WOULD NOT SAY WHAT HIS PARTY MIGHT HAVE DONE IF AN UNACCEPTABLE SOLUTION HAD BEEN IMMINENT, BUT HE QUESTIONED WHETHER DEMIREL WOULD HAVE EVER REACHED THIS POINT.

9. SOLARZ' MEETING WITH FORMER PKRIMIN SULEYMAN DEMIREL, CHAIRMAN OF THE MAJOR OPPOSITION JUSTICE PARTY, WAS MORE PRODUCTIVE. RESPONDING TO THE FIRST QUESTION ASKED OF ALL THREE MAJOR OPPOSITION PARTY LEADERS BY SOLARZ, DEMIREL

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SAID THAT IF THE EMBARGO CANNOT BE LIFTED BY CONGRESS, IT SHOULD NOT EVEN BE SUBMITTED FOR A VOTE. DEMIREL ADDED, "TO SAY THAT TURKEY HAS NO ALTERNATIVES IS WRONG, BUT TO SAY THAT TURKEY MIGHT DO SOMETHING SILLY OR HARMFUL IS ALSO WRONG. WE WILL DO WHAT IS BEST FOR TURKEY. IT MAY NOT BE WHAT WE WANT, BUT WE WILL ACT AS NECESSARY." REGARDING CYPRUS, DEMIREL SAID HIS PARTY CANNOT SUPPORT WHAT PUBLIC OPINION WILL NOT ACCEPT. HE SAID THAT THE TURKISH PUBLIC IS NOT READY FOR TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS, BUT HE ADDED

THAT ANY TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS (INCLUDING VAROSHA) WOULD BE LOOKED AT IN TERMS OF WHAT IS GAINED BY THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS IN THE OVERALL SETTLEMENT. DEMEREL ASSERTED TAHT LACK OF PROGRESS ON CYPRUS DURING HIS GOVERNMENTS CAN BE TRACED TO OBSTRUCTION WITHIN THOSE GOVERNMENTS, HIS FEAR THAT GIVING CONCESSIONS WOULD LEAD TO CHARGES THAT HE KNUCKLED UNDER TO THE PRESSURE OF THE ARMS EMBARGO, AND GREEK UNWILLINGNESS TO REACH A SETTLEMENT AS LONG AS THE US COULD BE USED AS AN INSTRUMENT OF GREEK POLICY TO WEAKEN AND ISOLATE TURKEY. MOREOVER, HE SAID, NO GREEK CYPRIOT LEADER IS WILLING TO ACCEPT ANY AGREEMENT ACKNOWLEDGING A DIVISION OF CYPRUS. DEMIREL SAID THAT PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS WOULD NOT BENEFIT TURKEY, AND HE STRONGLY DEFENDED THE VALUE OF SECRET DIPLOMACY. WHEN ASKED WHAT INCENTIVE TURKEY

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WOULD HAVE TO NEGOTIATE IF THE EMBARGO IS LIFTED, DEMIREL RESPONDED THAT A SETTLEMENT IS IN TURKEY'S BEST INTERESTS. THE DISPUTE CANNOT BE PERMITTED TO CONTINUE FOR YEARS, AND THE "TURKISH FEDERATED STATES OF CYPRUS" LACKS WORLD RECOGNITION AND CANNOT CONTINUE. IN CONCLUSION, THE FORMER PRIMIN MADE A PLEA FOR UNDERSTANDING THAT US-TURKISH RELATIONS ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN CYPRUS. HE EXPRESSED PRIDE THAT AS PRIMIN HE WAS ABLE TO AVOID THE SPOILING OF TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS BEYOND THE POINT OF REPAIR.

10. DURING HIS CONVERSATION WITH SOLARZ DEFMIN HASAN ESAT ISIK SAID THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF THE EMBARGO HAD BEEN MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE PHYSICAL ONES--ALTHOUGH APPROXIMATELY 50 PERCENT OF TURKISH AIR FORCE WAS GROUNDED AS A RESULT OF THE EMBARGO. IN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE EMBARGO WERE NOT LIFTED, ISIK SIMPLY SAID TURKEY WOULD

BE FORCED TO REDESIGN A MILITARY FORCE CONSISTENT WITH ITS ECONOMIC CAPACITY. ONE RESULT WOULD BE A REDUCTION IN TURKEY'S PARTICIPATION IN NATO--BUT NOT WITHDRAWAL. ASKED IF REPEAL OF 620X WOULD RESULT IN OPENING OF THE US INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS, ISIK HEDGED, SAYING "MORE CLARITY WITH RESPECT TO THE FUTURE OF US-TURKISH DEFENSE COOPERATION WOULD BE NECESSARY." HE SAID TURKEY IS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE THE CONDITIONS OF SUCH COOPERATION, INCLUDING THE OPENING OF THE INSTALLATIONS.

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11. DURING CONVERSATION WITH SEVERAL POLITICIANS AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AT RECEPTION AT RESIDENCE EVENING APRIL 4, SOLARZ REPEATED THE SAME POINTS HE HAD BEEN MAKING THROUGHOUT THE DAY:

--THE ADMINISTRATION'S DECISION TO SEEK REPEAL OF 620X, RATHER THAN ENDORSEMENT OF THE DCA, WAS THE RIGHT DECISION.

--THE CHANCES FOR CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROGRAM ARE GOOD BUT WILL TO A GREAT DEGREE BE DEPENDENT UPON THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION ACTIVELY SEEKS CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL.

--SUBSTANTIVE, NEGOTIABLE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS ON CYPRUS WILL IMPROVE CHANCES OF CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL.

--CONGRESSIONAL OPPONENTS WILL MAKE AN ALL-OUT EFFORT TO DEFEAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSALS. ONE KEY QUESTION WILL BE STATUS OF THE US INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS. AT THE VERY LEAST, THERE MUST BE A CLEAR GOT COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE PROMPT REOPENING AFTER CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF EMBARGO LIFTING. MUCH MORE HELPFUL WOULD BE GOT AGREEMENT TO TEMPORARY REOPENING PENDING CONCLUSION OF A NEW AGREEMENT GOVERNING THEIR OPERATION.

12. AS A RESULT OF HIS DISCUSSIONS IN ANKARA, SOLARZ LEFT WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT THE GOT IS PLEASED WITH THE ADMINISTRATION'S DECISION TO SEEK REPEAL OF THE EMBARGO RATHER THAN APPROVAL OF THE DCA. HE WAS ALSO OPTIMISTIC THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS WILL BE SERIOUS AND FORTHCOMING ENOUGH TO BE HELPFUL IN WINNING CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROGRAM. HE WAS LESS SATISFIED WITH THE ANSWERS HE HAD RECEIVED ON THE FUTURE STATUS OF THE US INSTALLATIONS. JUST PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE HE AGAIN MADE STRONG APPEAL TO SENIOR MFA OFFICER FOR

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GOT COOPERATION IN OVERCOMING CONGRESSIONAL OPPONENTS OF A
RESTORED US-TURKISH RELATIONSHIP.

13. DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT AS APPROPRIATE.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
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Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
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Draft Date: 05 apr 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X2
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
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Format: TEL
From: ANKARA
Handling Restrictions:
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Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
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Page Count: 11
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
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Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
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Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3074168
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CONGRESSMAN STEPHEN SOLARZ\ VISIT TO ANKARA
TAGS: OREP, TU, GR, CY, (SOLARZ, STEPHEN)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/ed077db6-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
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